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Abstract 
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) have recently received a great deal of 
attention in higher education. MOOCs demonstrate universities’ efforts in offering 
high-quality digital learning materials to everyone in the world, which should be 
encouraged. Nevertheless, as a MOOC platform must ensure its financial 
sustainability, it is questionable whether a platform’s profit-seeking pricing strategy 
will hurt the diversity of courses, such as eliminating courses with low certificate 
purchasing rates. To address this question, we adopt a game-theoretic framework to 
model the interaction and strategic choices of a MOOC platform, learners, and 
universities. Based on the certificate prices and revenue sharing ratios chosen by the 
platform for courses with various certificate purchasing rates, universities consider 
the competition intensity and decide their course quality levels, to attract learners. 
We conclude that all types of course will exists in equilibrium throughout the lifecycle 
of a MOOC platform, regardless of the technology maturity and competition intensity. 
We also find that course qualities may decrease when MOOCs become more accessible 
to learners. Finally, qualities of courses with different certificate purchasing rates are 
compared. 
Keywords: Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), Pricing, Diversification, Multi-
sided Platforms, Game Theory 
 
Introduction 
E-learning is considered so important for higher education (Franceschi et al., 2013, Ilie and Pavel, 2008, 
Popescu, 2012) and corporate knowledge management (Chen and Edgington, 2005).  
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) have recently received a great deal of attention in higher 
education. It has grown into a thriving battleground for prestigious universities competing regarding 
reputation and course quality by putting elite courses on MOOC platforms. The rapid expansion of 
MOOCs has sparked considerable interest in the higher education market, leading to springing 
emergence of MOOC platform providers such as Coursera, edX, and Udacity.1 
Coursera is one of the most popular MOOC platforms. As a for-profit company founded in 2012 by two 
Stanford Computer Science professors Daphne Koller and Andrew Ng, it currently has over 1600 
courses from over 140 institutions in 10 fields, including computer science, mathematics, business, 
humanities, social science, medicine, and engineering. edX is a non-profit and open source MOOC 
platform founded by Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University in 2012. It offers 
online courses from worldwide universities and institutions. Currently, there are a total of 30 subjects 
and over 950 courses in computer science, biology, engineering, architecture, data science, literature, 
social science, and more from about 106 institutions. Udacity is another for-profit initiative founded by 
Sebastian Thrun, David Stavens, and Mike Sokolsky with investment from venture capital offering 
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computer science, programming, and related courses by industry giants Google, AT&T, Facebook, 
Salesforce, Cloudera, etc. Despite their different management types and course composition, these three 
platforms all provide free access or audit alternatives.  
The most common revenue stream for a MOOC platform is to charge fees for certificates. Some other 
sources include selling student information to potential employers or advertisers, fee-based assignment 
grading, access to the social networks, etc. As for cooperating universities, they may receive a proportion 
of revenue from the certificate fees and other value-added services for students. For example, Young 
(2012) reports that Coursera shares 20% of gross revenue from certificates to partners. Partners may 
receive 6% to 15% of revenue for each career introduction by Coursera Career Services. edX also shares 
a proportion of revenue to their partners when total revenue goes beyond a threshold (Kolowich, 2013).  
By November 2016, Coursera earned over 600 thousand course certificates, and edX reached over 840 
thousand certificates. 2  However, the financial sustainability of this revenue models is yet to be 
confirmed. Most of these platforms currently still follow the common approach of Silicon Valley start-
ups by receiving investment from venture capital. The sustainability issue and profit model are still big 
concerns for most MOOC platforms. These issues are not only critical for these platforms but also 
important for learners around the world. First, if this “free-enrollment-paid-certificate” model can be 
proved to be financially sustainable, learners will be able to access free high-quality courses from 
universities and institutes all over the world. This would help people spread education to everywhere in 
the world. Second, even if this model can be sufficiently profitable, it is possible that the platforms offer 
only courses with high conversion rates (proportion of enrolled learners paying for the certificates). 
Whether appropriate diversity among courses can still be achieved in the long run is worth of 
investigation.  
As far as we know, there are quite a few studies discussing the business model of MOOCs, but rare of 
them adopt a theoretical framework to investigate the platform strategy. In this study, we present a 
game-theoretic model of the market for MOOCs. We assume that there are multiple types of course on 
the platform, some types are more attractive for students to buy certificates while some types are not. 
In other words, we assume that the conversion rates of some types are naturally higher than the 
conversion rate of low type. The conversion rate somehow implies the spirit of free access of MOOCs. 
The students do not need to pay for auditing the MOOCs, but only need to pay for the certificates. We 
also assume that there are several heterogeneous universities competing in offering MOOC courses. The 
platform decides the revenue sharing ratio and certificate price for each type of course. Universities then 
choose the quality of each type of course to maximize its utility. Under this setting, we investigate the 
platform’s strategic pricing choice, platform’s profit, and the induced course offering strategies of 
universities and course quality levels in equilibrium.  
In the next section, we review some related works with respect to MOOCs, network externality, and 
market of higher education. In section “Model”, we develop a game-theoretic model to describe the 
competitive relationship among universities. The platform's strategic choice of certificate prices and 
revenue sharing ratios are also formulated. Analysis and implications are presented in section 
“Analysis”. The summary of this paper is in section “Conclusion”. Due to the page limit, all proofs are 
omitted but can be requested from the authors.  
Literature Review 
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) are online courses aiming at unlimited participation and open 
access via the web (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2016). Introduced in 2008 and emerged as a popular mode 
of learning in 2012, MOOCs have become a popular approach of learning nowadays. Yuan and Powell 
(2013) point out that the development of MOOCs is rooted within the ideals of openness in education, 
knowledge should be shared freely, and the desire to learn should be met without demographic, 
economic, and geographical constraints. There are several studies discussing the business models and 
value propositions of MOOCs. Baker and Passmore (2016) propose four pricing strategies: cross-
subsidy, third-party, freemium, and nonmonetary. However, climate of cost-consciousness is still an 
issue. Belleflamme and Jacqmin (2016) propose five potential monetization strategies. The most 
sustainable approach seems to be the subcontractor model which allows MOOC platforms to deliver 
innovative education to universities, and sell made-to-measure training programs to private company. 
Burd et al. (2015) state that MOOCs potentially challenge the traditional dominance of higher education 
providers. It is said that prestigious universities will retain traditional degree and offer certificates on a 
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course-by-course basis, while other universities will trade these certificates of completion for course 
credits in long-term survivability. The feasibility of monetization of MOOC business is still in the air 
where opportunities and challenges coexist. 
Some past studies have addressed network externality issues. Network externality can be defined that 
there are many products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good increases 
with the number of other agents consuming the good (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). In Armstrong (2006) 
and Rochet and Tirole (2006), we can see two forms of network externality: same-side and cross-side. 
Same-side network externality usually happens in a one-sided market where volume of transactions 
realized on the platform depends only on the aggregate price level. Cross-side network externality 
usually happens in a two-sided market as one in which the volume of transactions between groups 
depends not only on the overall price level but on the size of another group. Therefore, cross-side 
network externality is an important property of a two-sided market. Armstrong (2006) develops an 
optimal pricing function similar to the Lerner index in monopoly platform to depict how the price 
elasticity of demand and the network externality affect the platform's pricing strategy. Hagiu (2009) 
introduces the consumer preferences of variety and finds that higher consumer preferences of variety 
leads to less substitutable among producers and greater market power of producers. Jing (2007) 
discusses how network externality affects the pricing of monopoly platform regarding vertical 
differentiation in quality. Rochet and Tirole (2006) develop a mixed model for the two-sided market 
and find that the platform could maximize its profit by manipulating the prices for buyer and seller. 
Even though there are different conclusion regarding to different network externality settings, there is 
no doubt that network externality plays a crucial part to study the rapid proliferation of platform 
economy. To better clarify the competition between the types of course offered by two universities, we 
leverage network externality to explain universities’ decisions in our study. 
As for higher education issues, Arcidiacono (2005) addresses how changing the admission and financial 
aid rules at colleges affects future earnings. In the model, college quality serves as a consumption good 
so that high ability individuals may have preferences for particular majors independent of effort costs. 
The model also includes decisions by schools as to which students to accept and how much financial aid 
to offer. Epple et al. (2006) present an equilibrium model of the market for higher education. Their 
model gives rise to a strict hierarchy of colleges that differ by the educational quality provided to the 
students. In equilibrium, the reservation price functions of each college and their beliefs about student 
matriculation must be consistent with utility maximization and the actions of the other colleges. These 
studies have disclosed the decision procedure for higher education market, and the spirit of pursuit of 
quality is consistent throughout these papers. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no 
research adopts a theoretic model to study the MOOC business. We plan to deliver new managerial 
insights to complement the study in the management of modern higher education. 
Model 
Players and decision sequence  
Universities and courses. Consider a MOOC platform (it) and two heterogeneous universities (for 
each of them, she), university 1 and university 2, competing in offering MOOCs. We assume that there 
are two types of courses on the MOOC platform, the high type and low type, where the high-type one 
has higher conversion rate and the low-type one. The high and low type will also be denoted by type H 
and L, respectively. Both universities may offer both types of courses. To facilitate discussion, we will 
sometimes call the type-j course offered by university 𝑖 the course (𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑗 ∈ {H, L}. The two 
courses differ in their conversion rate, i.e., the proportion of auditing students that will purchase the 
certificate. We assume that the conversion rate of the type-𝑗 course is 𝑎𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗, where  𝑎𝑗 > 0 and 𝑏𝑗 >
0 are all exogenous parameters for 𝑗 ∈ {H, L}, and  𝑝𝑗  is the certificate price of the type-𝑗 course. We 
assume that under the same price, the conversion rate of the high-type course is higher than that of the 
low one, i.e., 𝑎H − 𝑏H𝑝 > 𝑎L − 𝑏L𝑝 for all 𝑝 ≥ 0.  
Universities’ decisions. University 𝑖 needs to determine the quality of its type-𝑗 course to find a 
balance between the benefit and cost. The benefit consists of two parts, the reputation earned from 
students who audit the course and revenue shared by the platform from students purchasing the 
certificate. We represent the reputation as 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑗 , the number of auditing students 𝑛𝑖𝑗 times the course 
quality 𝑞𝑖𝑗 . This captures the fact that more reputation can be earned if more students audit the course, 
but the reputation is really high only if the course quality is high. The revenue earned by the platform is 
(𝑎𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑛𝑖𝑗, where 𝑝𝑗 is the certificate price of the type-𝑗 course and 𝑎𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗 is the corresponding 
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conversion rate. Given the revenue sharing ratio 𝑤𝑗  set by the platform, the university’s revenue from 
certificate sales is (𝑎𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑤𝑗𝑛𝑖𝑗 . Finally, as quality is costly, the university pays a cost 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑗
2 /2, 
where  𝛼𝑖𝑗 > 0  is an exogenous parameter scaling the cost, and the quadratic form is chosen for 
tractability.3 Collectively, the utility function of university 𝑖 is 
𝑢𝑖𝑗
U = 𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑗 + (𝑎𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑤𝑗𝛽𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗 −
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑗
2
2
, 
where the parameter 𝛽𝑖 adjusts how university 𝑖’s weighs the reputation and revenue. Upon observing 
𝑤𝑗s and 𝑝𝑗s, university 𝑖 then chooses its course quality levels 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ∈ [0, 1] to maximize its utility, where 
𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 0 means not offering the course and 𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 1 means offering the best possible course. Note that as 
𝑛𝑖𝑗 enters the benefit part of the utility function, it captures the positive cross-side network effect: the 
more students, the more incentive for a university to offer a course. To reduce tedious calculations and 
derivations that do not generate useful insights, we will assume that 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 throughout this paper.  
Students’ decisions. As different students (for each of them, he) may have different preferences over 
universities, we model the preference attitudes with a Hotelling line (Hotelling, 1929). Consider the 
courses of type L first. Let universities 1 and 2 locates at 0 and 1, the two endpoints of a line segment 
[0, 1], and 𝑥L be a student’s location in respect to course 𝑗, his utility of taking course (1, L) and (2, L) are 
𝑢1L
S = 𝜃1L𝑞1L − 𝑡𝑥L    and    𝑢2L
S = 𝜃2L𝑞2L − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥L),  
where  𝑡 > 0  is the “transportation cost” in the Hotelling line model, measuring different students’ 
preference over different universities, and 𝜃𝑖L is the students’ willingness-to-pay for a unit of quality of 
the type-L course offered by university 𝑖. As higher 𝜃𝑖L makes course (𝑖, L) attract more students,  𝜃𝑖L is 
also considered as university 𝑖’s authority in the field of the course of type L. The type-𝑥L student will 
choose to audit course (1, L), audit course (2, L), and does not audit any type-L course to maximize his 
utility, where the utility of the last option is normalized to 0. For high-type courses, we adopt the same 
setting. We assume that a student will audit at most one course of each type and may audit two courses 
of different types simultaneously.  
Platform’s decision. To optimize its decision about the certificate prices 𝑝𝑗s and revenue sharing 
ratios 𝑤𝑗s, the platform must first conduct an equilibrium analysis to predict the consequence of its 
decision. After the prediction about the course qualities 𝑞𝑖𝑗  and student size 𝑛𝑖𝑗 is done, the platform's 
problem is to maximize its profit 
𝜋𝑗
𝑃 = (1 − 𝑤𝑗)(𝑎𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑛𝑖𝑗, 
subject to the constraints 𝑤𝑗 ∈ [0, 1] and 𝑝𝑗 ≥ 0,𝑗 ∈ {H, L}. Note that 𝑛𝑖𝑗  depends on the universities’ 
choices of 𝑞𝑖𝑗 , which depends on the authority of universities 𝜃𝑖𝑗, the course development course 𝛼𝑖𝑗, 
and competition intensity (the smaller the 𝑡, the stronger the competition), etc. The platform would take 
these factors into consideration to set the two pricing variables 𝑤𝑗  and 𝑝𝑗  to induce desirable 
equilibrium behaviors chosen by the universities.  
Decision sequence. The sequence of events is as follows. First, the platform determines the revenue 
sharing ratio 𝑤𝑗  and the certificate price 𝑝𝑗 for the type-𝑗 course, 𝑗 ∈ {H, L} Second, the two universities 
act simultaneously, where university 𝑖 observes 𝑝𝑗 and 𝑤𝑗 and chooses its 𝑞𝑖L and 𝑞𝑖H. At the end, each 
student makes his course auditing choice, the sizes of students 𝑛𝑖𝑗 are realized, and the platform earns 
its profit. 
Market segmentation and assumptions 
Market segmentation. After the courses are offered by different universities at various quality levels, 
each student independently decides which course(s) to audit. In this subsection, we will derive the 
student size of course (𝑖, 𝑗), 𝑛𝑖𝑗, as a function of 𝑞𝑖𝑗 , 𝜃𝑖𝑗, and t.  
Consider the type-𝑗 course. As a type-𝑥𝑗 student sees the two type-𝑗 courses, he will be willing to take 
course (1, 𝑗) if 𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗 − 𝑡𝑥𝑗 ≥ 0, i.e., 𝑥𝑗 ≤
𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗
𝑡
. Similarly, if 𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗 − 𝑡(1 − 𝑥𝑗) ≥ 0, i.e., 𝑥𝑗 ≥ 1 −
𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗
𝑡
, he 
                                                             
3 It can be shown that our major findings will be qualitatively unchanged as long as the cost is an 
increasing and convex function of 𝑞𝑖𝑗 .  
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will be willing to take course (2, 𝑗). Let ?̅?1𝑗 =
𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗
𝑡
 and ?̅?2𝑗 = 1 −
𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗
𝑡
 be the two cutoff values, their 
relationship determines the equilibrium market segmentation. If ?̅?1𝑗 < ?̅?2𝑗 , the market is partially 
covered, some students do not take any type-𝑗 course, and 𝑛𝑖𝑗 =
𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑡
. See Figure 1 for a depiction. On 
the contrary, if ?̅?1𝑗 ≥ ?̅?2𝑗 , the market is fully covered, all students take a type- 𝑗  course from one 
university, and 𝑛1𝑗 = ?̅?0𝑗 = 1 − 𝑛2𝑗, where the type-?̅?0𝑗 student is indifferent in taking the course from 
either university. It then follows that ?̅?0𝑗  is the unique value satisfying 𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗 − 𝑡?̅?0𝑗 = 𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗 − 𝑡(1 −
?̅?0𝑗), i.e., ?̅?0𝑗 =
𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗
 −𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗
 +𝑡
2𝑡
. Figure 2 illustrates this scenario.  
  
Figure 1.  Market segmentation of partial 
coverage 
Figure 2.  Market segmentation of full 
coverage 
 
According to the derivations above, it can be observed that when the market will be partially or fully 
covered depends on the value of 𝑡. When 𝑡 is large, which means the cost of taking a MOOC is high, it is 
more likely that the market will be partially covered. As technology improves and an MOOC platform is 
more accessible to students, 𝑡 will become smaller, and it is more likely for the market to be fully covered. 
More precisely, the market is fully covered if and only if ?̅?1𝑗 ≥ ?̅?2𝑗 , which is equivalent to 𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗 +
𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗 ≥ 𝑡 . Because 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ≤ 1, if 𝜃1𝑗 + 𝜃2𝑗 < 𝑡 , the market must be partially covered regardless of the 
course qualities; if 𝜃1𝑗 + 𝜃2𝑗 ≥ 𝑡, it is then possible for the two universities to fully cover the market of 
the type-𝑗 course.  
Assumptions. We consider both the full coverage and partial coverage scenarios under some mild 
assumptions. First, under partial coverage, we assume that none of the universities can take the whole 
market even with the best possible course (𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 1). As 𝑛𝑖𝑗 =
𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑡
 under partial coverage, this means to 
assume 𝑡 > max
𝑖,𝑗
{𝜃𝑖𝑗} . Second, as the providers of MOOCs are usually prestigious universities and 
institutions, the cost of offering a course is typically an insignificant part in their annual budgets.  
Moreover, modern technology has diminished the difficulties to digitalize a course, which also implies 
that the course development cost is low. As 𝛼𝑖𝑗 is believed to be small, we assume 𝜃1j + 𝜃2j < min {
𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
} to 
avoid tedious comparisons that do not generate useful managerial insights.  
Lifecycle of MOOCs and the four periods 
As we mentioned above, the relationship between 𝑡  and 𝜃1𝑗 + 𝜃2𝑗  has an impact on the equilibrium 
market segmentation. Moreover, the value of 𝑡 also determines whether a university’s utility function 
with respect to a course is convex or concave (to be detailed below). These two factors drive us to divide 
the lifecycle of MOOCs into four periods depending on the value of 𝑡 (cf. Figure 3):  
 
Figure 3.  Lifecycle of MOOCs for the type-𝒋 course assuming 𝜽𝟏𝒋𝜶𝟐𝒋 > 𝜽𝟐𝒋𝜶𝟏𝒋 
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 In the start-up period, we have max {
2𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
} < 𝑡 : The cost of taking a MOOC is quite large, both 
universities find their utility functions concave (and thus are less willing to offer the course to the 
highest possible quality level by setting 𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 1), and the market is partially covered.  
 In the growth period, we have  min {
2𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
} < 𝑡 ≤ max {
2𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
} : The cost is still high, but one of the 
university’s utility function becomes convex. This university will either offer the best possible course 
(𝑞𝑖𝑗 = 1) or offer nothing. The market is still partially covered.  
 In the expansion period, we have  𝜃1j + 𝜃2j < 𝑡 ≤ min {
2𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
}: The cost becomes lower, MOOCs are 
accessible to more students, and both universities find their utility functions convex. However, the 
market is still partially covered.  
 In the mature period, we have 𝑡 ≤ 𝜃1j + 𝜃2j: The technology is well developed, platform is robust 
enough, and universities may attract students easily. Both universities have convex utility functions, 
and it is possible for the market to be fully covered.   
Obviously, the platform’s optimal pricing decisions may be different from period to period. Therefore, 
the platform needs to conduct a separate equilibrium analysis for each of the four periods. In the next 
section, we will first analyze the platform’s pricing decisions in the four periods and then characterize 
the equilibrium certificate prices, revenue sharing ratios, and course qualities. We then combine the 
analyses for the four periods to deliver our main messages.  
Table 1. List of decision variables and parameters 
Decision variables 
𝑝𝑗  The certificate price of the type-j course determined by the platform 
𝑞𝑖𝑗   The course quality of the type-j course determined by the university 𝑖 
𝑤𝑗   The revenue sharing ratio of the type-j course determined by the platform 
Parameters 
𝜃𝑖𝑗  
The students’ willingness-to-pay for a unit of quality of the type-j course 
offered by university 𝑖 
𝑡  The transportation cost to the course on the platform 
𝑛𝑖𝑗  The number of students auditing the type-j course offered by university 𝑖 
𝑎𝑗  An exogenous parameter regarding the conversion rate of the type-j course  
𝑏𝑗  An exogenous parameter regarding the conversion rate of the type-j course  
𝛼𝑗  An exogenous parameter regarding the cost of the type-j course 
𝛽𝑗  
An exogenous parameter regarding how university 𝑖’s weighs the reputation 
and revenue 
Analysis 
We characterize the quality pair (𝑞1𝑗 , 𝑞2𝑗), revenue sharing ratio 𝑤𝑗 , certificate price 𝑝𝑗, and profit of the 
platform 𝜋𝑗
P in equilibrium under the four periods for each 𝑗 ∈ {H, L}. We investigate the transportation 
cost cut-offs between the high- and low-type courses and their respective quality levels. The implications 
about market equilibrium and the platform’s strategic choice will then be drawn.  
As we mentioned in the model, the utility of student taking university 1 and university 2 can be 
formulated as 𝑢1𝑗
S = 𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗 − 𝑡𝑥𝑗 and 𝑢2𝑗
S = 𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗 − 𝑡𝑥𝑗. Under partial market coverage, the size of the 
student taking universities 1 and 2 can be calculated as 𝑛1𝑗 =
𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗
𝑡
 and  𝑛2𝑗 =
𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗
𝑡
, respectively. 
Therefore, the utilities of university 1 and university 2 can be formulated as 
𝑢1𝑗
U = 𝑞1𝑗
2 (
𝜃1𝑗
𝑡
−
𝛼1𝑗
2
) + 𝑞1𝑗 (
(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑤𝑗𝛽1𝜃1𝑗
𝑡
) and 𝑢2𝑗
U = 𝑞2𝑗
2 (
𝜃2𝑗
𝑡
−
𝛼2𝑗
2
) + 𝑞2𝑗 (
(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑤𝑗𝛽2𝜃2𝑗
𝑡
). 
If 2𝜃𝑖𝑗−𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 0, the utility function is convex; if 2𝜃𝑖𝑗−𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 < 0, the utility function is concave. Under 
full market coverage, the size of the student taking university 1 and university 2 can be calculated as 
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𝑛1𝑗 =
𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗
 −𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗
 +𝑡
𝑡
 and  𝑛2𝑗 =
𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗
 −𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗
 +𝑡
𝑡
, respectively. Therefore, the utility of university 1 and 
university 2 can be formulated as 
𝑢1𝑗
U = 𝑞1𝑗
2 (
𝜃1𝑗
2𝑡
−
𝛼1𝑗
2
) + 𝑞1𝑗 (
𝑡−𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗+(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑤𝑗𝛽1𝜃1𝑗+(𝑡−𝜃2𝑗𝑞2𝑗)(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑤𝑗𝛽1
2𝑡
)   
and 
𝑢2𝑗
U = 𝑞2𝑗
2 (
𝜃2𝑗
2𝑡
−
𝛼2𝑗
2
) + 𝑞1𝑗(
𝑡−𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗+(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑤𝑗𝛽2𝜃2𝑗+(𝑡−𝜃1𝑗𝑞1𝑗)(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑤𝑗𝛽2
2𝑡
). 
If 𝜃𝑖𝑗−𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 > 0, the utility function is convex; if 𝜃𝑖𝑗−𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 < 0, the utility function is concave.  
Since that the profit function of the platform is 𝜋𝑗
𝑃 = (1 − 𝑤𝑗)(𝑎𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑛𝑖𝑗 , the optimal 𝑝𝑗  can be 
derived as  
𝑎𝑗
2𝑏𝑗
, and (𝑎𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗  is always  
𝑎𝑗
2
4𝑏𝑗
. For the platform, the more challenging decision to 
consider is the revenue sharing ratio 𝑤𝑗 , which will be explicitly characterized for each of the four 
periods below.  
Equilibrium Analysis  
Start-up period 
In the start-up period, the transportation cost is so high (𝑡 > max {
2𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
}) that the student base does not 
contribute too much for the university. The market is partial covered. The utility function of each 
university is concave, and the first-order condition leads to the optimal course quality  
𝑞𝑖𝑗
∗ (𝑤𝑗) = max {
(𝑎𝑗 − 𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝑤𝑗𝛽𝑖𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 2𝜃𝑖𝑗
, 1} 
As a function of the revenue sharing ratio. Then, the size of students 𝑛𝑖𝑗  can be calculated. The 
platform's problem is to maximize its profit by determining 𝑤𝑗 . Since that 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ∈ [0, 1], we can find out 
the constraints of 𝑤𝑗 ∈ [0, 1] accordingly in equilibrium. 
Lemma 1. Consider the type-𝑗 course. In the start-up period, let 
𝜃1𝑗
𝛼1𝑗
>
𝜃2𝑗
𝛼2𝑗
 without loss of generality, 
and let 𝐵1 =
𝛼1𝑗𝑡−2𝜃1𝑗
(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝛽1𝜃1𝑗
 and 𝐵2 =
𝛼2𝑗𝑡−2𝜃2𝑗
(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝛽2𝜃2𝑗
. We have  
𝑤𝑗
∗ =
{
 
 
 
 
1
2
𝑖𝑓 
1
2
< 𝐵1
𝐵1 𝑖𝑓 
1
2
−
𝜃1𝑗𝐵2
2𝜃2𝑗
< 𝐵1 ≤
1
2
1
2
−
𝜃1𝑗𝐵2
2𝜃2𝑗
𝑖𝑓 𝐵1 ≤ 
1
2
−
𝜃1𝑗𝐵2
2𝜃2𝑗
   
as the platform’s optimal revenue sharing ratio. The equilibrium qualities are 
(𝑞1𝑗
∗ , 𝑞2𝑗
∗ ) =
{
 
 
 
 (𝑞1𝑗
∗ (
1
2
) , 𝑞2𝑗
∗ (
1
2
)) 𝑖𝑓 
1
2
< 𝐵1
(1, 𝑞2𝑗
∗ (𝐵1)) 𝑖𝑓 
1
2
−
𝜃1𝑗𝐵2
2𝜃2𝑗
< 𝐵1 ≤
1
2
(1, 𝑞2𝑗
∗ (
1
2
−
𝜃1𝑗𝐵2
2𝜃2𝑗
)) 𝑖𝑓 𝐵1 ≤
1
2
−
𝜃1𝑗𝐵2
2𝜃2𝑗
  
where 𝑞2𝑗
∗ < 1 in all three cases and  𝑞1𝑗
∗ < 1 if 𝐵1 >
1
2
. 
As not many learners have adopted MOOCs (𝑡 is large), the platform should always choose a positive 
revenue sharing ratio 𝑤𝑗  to encourage the universities to participate in the market in the start-up period. 
In fact, in this period the demand is so small so that the platform’s optimal revenue sharing ratio is  
definitely higher than 
1
2
. More than half of the revenues must be given to the universities. We may also 
observe that it is impossible for both universities to offer the courses to the highest possible quality. 
Fortunately, none of them will quit and offer nothing. The concavity of their utility function drives them 
to offer a course, even if the optimal quality is low.  
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Growth period 
In the growth period, 𝑡 locates between min {
2𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
} and max {
2𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
}. The market is partial covered. Suppose 
that 
𝜃1𝑗
𝛼1𝑗
>
𝜃2𝑗
𝛼2𝑗
, the utility function of university 1 will be convex and that of university 2 will be concave. 
We can identify optimal 𝑞1𝑗 and 𝑞2𝑗 and the constraints of 𝑤𝑗 .  
Lemma 2. Consider the type-𝑗 course. In the growth period, let 
𝜃1𝑗
𝛼1𝑗
>
𝜃2𝑗
𝛼2𝑗
 without loss of generality, 
and let 𝐶1 =
𝛼1𝑗𝑡−2𝜃1𝑗
(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝛽1𝜃1𝑗
 and 𝐶2 =
𝛼2𝑗𝑡−2𝜃2𝑗
(𝑎𝑗−𝑏𝑗𝑝𝑗)𝑝𝑗𝛽2𝜃2𝑗
. We have 
𝑤𝑗
∗ = {
1
2
−
𝜃2𝑗𝐶2
2𝜃1𝑗
𝑖𝑓 
1
2
−
𝜃2𝑗𝐶2
2𝜃1𝑗
< 𝐶2
𝐶2 𝑖𝑓 𝐶2 ≤
1
2
−
𝜃2𝑗𝐶2
2𝜃1𝑗
  
and  
(𝑞1𝑗
∗ , 𝑞2𝑗
∗ ) =
{
 
 (1, 𝑞2𝑗
∗ (
1
2
−
𝜃2𝑗𝐶2
2𝜃1𝑗
)) 𝑖𝑓 
1
2
−
𝜃2𝑗𝐶2
2𝜃1𝑗
< 𝐶2
(1, 1) 𝑖𝑓 𝐶2 ≤
1
2
−
𝜃2𝑗𝐶2
2𝜃1𝑗
   
where 𝑞2𝑗
∗ < 1 if  
1
2
−
𝜃2𝑗𝐶2
2𝜃1𝑗
< 𝐶2. Because 𝑡 ∈ (𝑚𝑖𝑛 {
2𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
} ,𝑚𝑎𝑥 {
2𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝛼𝑖𝑗
}) implies 0 < 𝐶2 <
8𝑏𝑗(𝜃1𝑗𝛼2𝑗−𝜃2𝑗𝛼1𝑗)
𝑎𝑗
2𝛽2𝜃2𝑗𝛼1𝑗
, 
the optimal quality pair (1, 1) exists if and only if  
8𝑏𝑗(𝜃1𝑗𝛼2𝑗−𝜃2𝑗𝛼1𝑗)
𝑎𝑗
2𝛽2𝜃2𝑗𝛼1𝑗
<
1
2
−
𝜃2𝑗𝐶2
2𝜃1𝑗
. 
According to Lemma 2, the platform will still set a positive revenue sharing ratio 𝑤𝑗
∗ to stimulate the 
participation of the university. Compared to the optimal ratio in the start-up period, we may find that 
in the growth period, the optimal ratio may be lower than 
1
2
, which is impossible in the start-up period. 
It is still possible that it is too expensive for the platform to make all the universities set their qualities 
to 1, if 𝑡 is large enough. However, university 1, the university with convex utility, finds it optimal to 
maximize the course quality.  
Expansion period 
In the expansion period, the transportation cost becomes smaller, though the market is still partial 
covered. Both universities’ utility functions are convex in this period. Therefore, each university will 
only consider the corner solutions 𝑞𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0,1} in course offering. It can be proved that in equilibrium 
(𝑞1, 𝑞2) can be neither (1, 0) nor (0, 1): As long as one university finds it profitable to offer the course, 
the other would also benefit from offering a course. (1, 1) is the unique equilibrium. This is summarized 
in Lemma 3.  
Lemma 3. Consider the type-𝑗 course. In expansion period, we have 𝑤𝑗
∗ = 0 and (𝑞1𝑗
∗ , 𝑞2𝑗
∗ ) = (1, 1) if 
𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 for all 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}. 
  
Figure 4.  Corner solutions in 
expansion period 
Figure 5.  Corner solutions in mature 
period 
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In Lemma 3, even though the platform set the optimal revenue sharing ratio  𝑤𝑗
∗  to zero, both 
universities will offer the qualities to one because the transportation cost 𝑡 is at the best region: it is low 
so that it is easy for a university to offer a course to attract many students, and it is high enough so that 
the two universities’ courses are not really in a competition. This may be the case, e.g., that all people in 
the world have high-speed free Internet access, and the concept of MOOCs has been widely adopted, 
but the technology of automatic translation is still imperfect. Therefore, a university may easily attract 
a lot of students in its own language, and the threat from a course using a foreign language is weak. Each 
university will drive itself to offer the best course regardless of the revenue sharing ratio, and the 
platform takes away all the certificate revenues. The universities are comfortable with having no 
certificate income because the high reputation earned through course offering is good enough.  
Mature period 
In the mature period, the utility function of the university is convex. Moreover, now 𝑡 is so small that if 
both universities offer their courses to the highest possible quality level, the market will be fully covered. 
In other words, in such a (𝑞1, 𝑞2) = (1, 1) situation, the two universities really compete in qualities to 
win students. We can identify six corner solutions (cf. Figure 5), i.e., three full coverage solution (1, 1), 
(1,
𝑡−𝜃1𝑗
𝜃2𝑗
), and (
𝑡−𝜃2𝑗
𝜃1𝑗
, 1) and three partial coverage solutions (0, 0), (0, 1), and (1, 0). We investigate the 
equilibrium by examining that there is no player can be better off by a unilateral change, and figure out 
the constraints of 𝑤𝑗 . 
Lemma 4. Consider the type- 𝑗  course. In the mature period, we have 𝑤𝑗
∗ = 0  and  (𝑞1𝑗
∗ , 𝑞2𝑗
∗ ) ∈
{(1,
𝑡−𝜃1𝑗
𝜃2𝑗
) , (
𝑡−𝜃2𝑗
𝜃1𝑗
, 1)} if 𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 for all 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}. It can be verified that all the solutions along the line 
between (1,
𝑡−𝜃1𝑗
𝜃2𝑗
)and (
𝑡−𝜃2𝑗
𝜃1𝑗
, 1) for all 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻} are not equilibria. 
Lemma 4 shows that the universities would set their quality so that the market is exactly full covered. 
The fact is that both universities find it beneficial to offer high-quality courses. However, as long as one 
university has set its quality to 1, the other university will find it not worthwhile to also set the quality 
to 1 due to the competition. The convexity of the utility function would then suggest the university to 
set the quality to exactly the level that attracts all the remaining learners. Interestingly, we have no idea 
which university will get the chance to be the one offering the course of higher quality, as there exist two 
equilibria in this case. Despite of this, both equilibria yield the same profit to the platform.  
Discussions and Implications  
Having the equilibrium qualities characterized in the previous section, we now examine the 
relationships between the transportation cost and the optimal qualities in each period.  
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, we have 𝑞𝑖𝑗
∗ > 0 for all 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡. The optimal qualities of both high type 
and low type throughout the four periods are all positive in equilibrium. 
Our first finding is regarding whether the diversity of the courses exists throughout the four periods in 
equilibrium. As the low type course results in a low purchase conversion rate, and the high 
transportation cost in the initial period lowers the university’s intention to offer the course, it seems 
that under some periods some types of course will not be offered. Somewhat surprisingly, we find out 
that both types of course exist throughout the four periods in equilibrium. This fact may be explained 
as follows. When 𝑡 is small, even the low-type course may benefit a university by earning it reputation. 
When 𝑡  is large, such a benefit does decrease, but the universities will at the same time find the 
competition between them become less intense. Given that the platform earns revenue only when 
universities offer courses, it will always adjust the revenue sharing proportion to induce course offering. 
It then follows that there is always enough incentives for both universities to offer both types of courses.  
Below we discuss the equilibrium quality levels of courses. We are particularly interested in the number 
of “excellent courses,” which are defined as courses whose quality levels are 1.  
Proposition 2. There is one excellent course in the mature period and two in the expansion period. 
In the growth period, if 
8𝑏𝑗(𝜃1𝑗𝛼2𝑗−𝜃2𝑗𝛼1𝑗)
𝑎𝑗
2𝛽2𝜃2𝑗𝛼1𝑗
<
1
2
−
𝜃2𝑗𝐵2
2𝜃1𝑗
, there exists a sub-period such that there are two 
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excellent courses; otherwise, there is only one throughout the growth period. In the start-up period, 
there is no excellent when 𝑡 >
𝑎𝑗
2𝛽1𝜃1𝑗+16𝑏𝑗𝜃1𝑗
8𝑏𝑗𝛼1𝑗
; otherwise, there is an excellent course. 
Somewhat surprisingly, it shows that the maximum number of excellent courses locates in expansion 
period rather than mature period. As aforementioned, due to the intense competition and limited 
number of learners, in the mature period one university will find it suboptimal to offer an excellent 
course. Note that, in growth period, the optimal quality pair (1,1) exists if its 𝑤𝑗
∗ locates in growth period 
(cf. Figure 6). Otherwise, only (1, 𝑞2𝑗
∗ ) exists in the growth period (cf. Figure 7).  
 
Figure 6.  The change of numbers of 𝒒𝒊𝒋
∗ = 𝟏 in 𝒕 if  
𝟖𝒃𝒋(𝜽𝟏𝒋𝜶𝟐𝒋−𝜽𝟐𝒋𝜶𝟏𝒋)
(𝒂𝒋
𝟐𝜷𝟐𝜽𝟐𝒋𝜶𝟏𝒋)
<
𝟏
𝟐
−
𝒂𝒋
𝟐𝜽𝟐𝒋(𝟐𝒕−𝟐𝜽𝟐𝒋)
𝟖𝒃𝒋𝜷𝟐𝜽𝟏𝒋𝜽𝟐𝒋
 
 
Figure 7.  The change of numbers of 𝒒𝒊𝒋
∗ = 𝟏 in 𝒕 if  
𝟖𝒃𝒋(𝜽𝟏𝒋𝜶𝟐𝒋−𝜽𝟐𝒋𝜶𝟏𝒋)
(𝒂𝒋
𝟐𝜷𝟐𝜽𝟐𝒋𝜶𝟏𝒋)
≥
𝟏
𝟐
−
𝒂𝒋
𝟐𝜽𝟐𝒋(𝟐𝒕−𝟐𝜽𝟐𝒋)
𝟖𝒃𝒋𝜷𝟐𝜽𝟏𝒋𝜽𝟐𝒋
 
We now move forward to compare the quality levels of the two types of courses. Is it always the case 
that the high-type courses will be offered at a higher quality level? Or is it possible for a low-type course 
to possess better quality? The two propositions below address these questions.  
Proposition 3. If 𝜃𝑖𝑗 = 𝜃  for all 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} , 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻}  and 𝛼𝑖𝐿 > 𝛼𝑖𝐻  for 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} , there exists 𝑡 >
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑖∈{1,2}
{
2𝜃
𝛼𝑖𝐿
}  such that 𝑞𝑖𝐻
∗ ≥ 𝑞𝑖𝐿
∗  for all 𝑖 ∈ {1,2} . Moreover, if 𝑎𝐻 > 𝑎𝐿 and 𝑏𝐻 ≤ 𝑏𝐿 , there exists 𝑡 >
𝑎𝐿
2𝛽1𝜃1𝐿+16𝑏𝐿𝜃1𝐿
8𝑏𝐿𝛼1𝐿
 such that 𝑞𝑖𝐻
∗ ≥ 𝑞𝑖𝐿
∗  for all 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}.  
The quality-gap periods of 𝑡 mentioned in Proposition 3 are marked with grey color in Figure 8. If the 
effort cost of type L is larger than type H, and 𝑡 locates in these quality-gap periods, then the optimal 
quality of type L is smaller than or equal to type H. Notice that the phenomenon might happen in start-
up period or growth period. We suggest that the government and organization concerned should pay 
more attention to aid the university with higher effort cost to raise the quality in these early periods. 
 
 Pricing and Diversification of MOOCs 
  
Twenty First Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, Langkawi 2017 
 
Figure 8.  The gaps of optimal equilibrium between type H and L when 𝜶𝒊𝐋 > 𝜶𝒊𝐇 
Proposition 4. If 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 for all 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, 𝑗 ∈ {𝐿, 𝐻} and 𝜃𝑖𝐻 > 𝜃𝑖𝐿  for 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, then for all 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, 
there exists 𝑡 > 𝜃1𝐿 + 𝜃2𝐿  such that 𝑞𝑖𝐿
∗ ≥ 𝑞𝑖𝐻
∗ , and there exists 𝑡 > 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑖∈{1,2}
{
2𝜃
𝛼𝑖𝐿
}  such that 𝑞𝑖𝐻
∗ ≥ 𝑞𝑖𝐿
∗ . 
Moreover, if 𝑎𝐻 > 𝑎𝐿and 𝑏𝐻 ≤ 𝑏𝐿, there exists 𝑡 >
𝑎𝐿
2𝛽1𝜃1𝐿+16𝑏𝐿𝜃1𝐿
8𝑏𝐿𝛼1𝐿
 such that 𝑞𝑖𝐻
∗ ≥ 𝑞𝑖𝐿
∗  for all 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
The quality-gap periods of 𝑡  mentioned in Proposition 4 are marked with grey color in Figure 9. 
Surprisingly, if the reputation of type H is larger than type L, and 𝑡 locates in the quality-gap period 
near 𝜃1𝑗 + 𝜃2𝑗, then the optimal quality of type L is larger than or equal to type H because type H falls 
in mature period earlier than type L near this gap. The competition of type L is more intense in the 
quality-gap period near 𝜃1𝑗 + 𝜃2𝑗. If 𝑡 locates in the other two quality-gap periods, the optimal quality 
of type L is smaller than or equal to type H because the reputation of type H is larger than type L. 
 
Figure 9.  The gaps of optimal equilibrium between type H and L when 𝜽𝒊𝐇 > 𝜽𝒊𝐋 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we adopt a theoretical framework to investigate an MOOC platform's strategic choice of 
the certificate prices and the revenue sharing ratios for coordinating supply and demand. By modelling 
the maximization problems of the platform’s profit and the university’s utility, the equilibrium quality 
levels and profits are then derived. Thus, the platform’s optimal strategic pricing choice are determined.  
In our opinion, we believe that diversity of course type make the world of MOOCs more colourful. 
Fortunately, we conclude that all types of course will exists in equilibrium throughout the lifecycle on 
the MOOC platform. We show that the number of courses of the highest possible quality may not always 
increase as technologies become more mature and MOOCs become more popular due to the potential 
competition among universities. Moreover, the difference in effort level and reputation between 
universities on the platform will lead to the gaps of optimal equilibrium between different types of 
course.  
We may further extend our research into the following directions. First, we can change the time 
sequence and event so that the university controls the price, and the platform controls an overall 
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revenue sharing ratio over different types of course. Second, it would be thorough to address the issue 
that a proportion of learners are not that free to study all types of course on the platform because of 
time constraints. A theoretical investigation on the impact of competition across different types of 
courses may contribute to the literature.  
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